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KARL L. JACKSON,
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

OPENING STATEMENT

In replying to the arguments contained in respondent's
brief, we first desire to call attention to the fact that respondent
concedes he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law but
urges that such negligence was not the proximate cause of the

injuries which he sustained. Each of the four points set out in
respondent's brief contains the statement that whether the particular conduct of the plaintiff "proximately contributed to the

accident" was a question of fact to be decided by the jury. This
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obviously limits the issue to be decided by the Supreme Court
to one of whether plaintiH's conduct proximately contributed
to the accident rather than a determination of whether plaintiff
was guilty of negligence. Therefore, appellant in the argument
to follow will call the Court's attention to the evidence, which it
is claimed shows as a matter of law that the conduct of the
plaintiff did "proximately contribute" to his own injury, citing
additional authorities in support of such argument.

ARGUMENT
I and II
PARKING PLAINTIFF'S TRUCK ON THE SOUTH HALF OF
THE HIGHWAY WITHOUT WARNING LIGHTS OR FLARES
PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT

Respondent's first points urge that the parking of
plaintiff's truck in the position it was placed across the
highway without flares or other signals, did not, as a
matter of law, proximately contribute to the accident.
Respondent concedes that the parking of the truck in this
position was in violation of the statute and negligence
but goes on to say "it was nontheless for the jury to determine whether such negligence proximately contributed
to the accident," citing 4 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Auto-mobile Law and Practice, Part 2, Section 2683. Respondent's argument that the jury, by its verdict, found that
the position in which the Early car was parked on the
highway did not proximately contribute to the accident
is begging the question since it is not what the jury found
that determines the matter, but what the jury should
have found, as a matter of law, which is before the Supreme Court on appeal.

2
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Of course, of all of the acts comn1itted by the plaintiff, the act of parking his truck was the one most reutote
in tilne fro1n the accident, and therefore, to that extent
is the least persuasive of the position taken by appellant
that plaintiff 'vas negligent as a matter of law, which contributed to his own injuries. We recognize that under
certain circumstances the parking of a vehicle momentarily on a highway has been held not to be sufficient to
establish "proximate cause" as a matter of law. The facts
in this case, however, with respect to the parking of
plaintiff's truck across the entire width of the highway
reserved for east-bound traffic in such a position that no
lights reflected either to the east or tQ the west, but in a
northerly-southerly direction was such as to compel a
finding of negligence proximately contributing to the
accident.
In the case of Dragotis v. Kennedy, (Minn.) 250
N.W. 804, a guest in an auton1obile sued to recover for
damages sustained when he was injured while assisting
in repairing a flat tire. The· driver of the car in whi-ch
plaintiff was riding stopped the automobile in the traffic
lane, making no attempt to get on to the shoulder, the
left wheels of the car being left within two feet of the
center line of the pavement. Plaintiff assisted in rep·airing the tire by holding a flashlight with its rays reflected
on the wheel of the car so that others might remove the
rim. There were no lights reflected from the rear of the
automobile.
An east-bound car being driven by defendant Anderson ran into the parked automobile pushing it against
3
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the plaintiff, causing his injuries. In affirming a direct
verdict ag,ainst the plaintiff for contributory negligence,
the Court said:
''True, as argued by plaintiff, it is only in a
clear case where from the facts it is plain that
reasonable persons can draw only one conclusion
that the question of contributory negligence becomes one of law. But, wide as is the latitude for
jury consideration, there remains upon trial
judges and this court the duty to keHp their conclusions within the limits of reason. Those limits
are fixed, not by what any one mind does conclude, but by what reasonable minds, functioning
without bias, may conclude. In each such case
the question presented is whether there is any
reasonable ground for absolving the plaintiff
from negligence.
"We assume that defendant Anderson was
negligent. It is obvious that defendant Kennedy
was grossly so. With opportunity to get off the
road for a tire change, it is bad enough, the conduct utterly inexcusable both as discourtesy and
negligence, to obstruct a highway in the daytime
as Kennedy obstructed the road on this occasion.
Where darkness, wet pavement, and the absence
of taillight or other signal to warn approaching
traffic are also factors, it so clearly amounts to
gross negligence as to defy further attempts at
polite characterization. Plaintiff, not lacking in
discernment or other mental capabilities, without
protest, actively participated in Kennedy's conduct. Moreover, he put himself within a foot or
so of the center line of the pavement, standing or
'Squatting,' with the rays of the flash-light turned
downward, ignoring or deliberately risking the
danger of his situation and that to other cars com4
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ing fron1 the "rest. What, if anything, plaintiff
and his companions co·uld have done to make the
risk greater or more ob'lli.ous has not been suggested. True, plaintiff was charged with th.e. duty
to exercise only due care. But that means a degree of care commensurate with the danger. So,
where one actively participates, as plaimJiff did,
in creating an obvious danger, he cannot escape
being charged with contributory negligence as
matter of lau\" (Italics added.)
In that case as in the present case the plaintiff attempted to shift the responsibility to the defendant by
claiming that he was entitled to assume that other persons approaching would exercise due care. In commenting upon this argument, the Court further stated:
"That rule has no application where it is
plain, as it should have been to plaintiff, that even
the exercise of great care by others may not prevent injury. It is not due care to depend upon
the exercise of another when such reliance is accompanied by obvious danger. Heath v. Wolesky,
181 Minn. 492, 233 N. W. 239. It would be difficult
for fancy to suppose circumstances making more
clearly unreasonable dependence upon careful
conduct of others than those of this case, which
plaintiff helped to create."
The only distinguishing characteristic in that case
was that it was raining slightly and there was poor visibility. On the other hand, we do not have the factors
there present as in the instant case of knowledge on the
part of the injured party that an automobile was approaching.

5
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In the case of Haase v. Willers Truck Service,
(S.D.) 34 N. W. 2d 313, the plaintiff appealed from a
judgment directed in favor of the defendants. The collision in that case which caused the death of the decedent
occurred on U. S. Highway 77, about 2:lj2 miles northwest of Jefferson, South Dakota. The pavement was 20
feet wide with shoulders of approximately 8 feet on each
side and then a 6 foot or 7 foot slope to a ditch which was
filled with snow. The road was slippery due to ice and
snow accumulation. The decedent was called to the.scene
of the accident with a wrecker to herlp remove an automobile from the ditch. The wrecker truck was parked
diagonally across a portion of the roadway with the
front end extending on to the pavement two feet or three
feet and in such a position so as to block off the lights of
the Sheriff's car from approaching traffic from the west.
As in the present case "the head lights of the tow truck
cast their rays at an angle with the highway and slightly
up." Decedent got out of the tow truck and attempted to
pl~ce chains on the right rear wheel when the defendant
driver operating a truck eastwardly along the highway
failed to see the parked wrecker truck until he was approximately one hundred feet or less from it. Defendant's truck struck the wrecker a glancing blow forcing it
over the body of decedent, resulting in his death.
In discussing the facts of the case, the Court stated:

".A seeming contempt for a peril with which
he was thoroughly familiar was a contributing
cause of the death of the decedent. He took an
unnecessary risk. He placed his truck so that it

6
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obstructed a portion of the 20-foot ribbon of pa,vement. No reason is or can be suggested which
justified hi1n in failing to remove his truck at least
to the 8-foot shoulder while he was putting on his
chains. In so doing he failed to conform to the
statutory standard of conduct prescribed by SDC.
44.0324. Duncan v. niadrid, 44 N.M. 249, 101 P.2d
382; Kassela v. Hoseth, 217 Wis. 115, 258 N.W.
340; Huston v. Robinson, 144 Neb. 553, 13 N.W.
2d 885. He knew the position of his car because
he had placed it. He knew that it extended on to
the pavement and that it Inasked the· blinker light
on the sheriff's car from the right hand, eastbound
traffic which his truck obstructed. He knew of the
heavy load of trucking and other traffic which
traveled that way. The hazard added by the ice
was apparent. Because of the ice the most careful driver coming from the we·st was a source of
danger. He knew that no warning flares or guard
had been placed to the west. He must have known
that positioned as he was, the sheriff offered him
little protection. In the face of all of this he
crawled under his truck to p·ut a chain· on its right
wheel. If he had not been under or behind the
truck or if it had not extended on to the pavement,
decedent would not have been injured." (Italics
added.)

See, also, Russell v. Phillips, (Colo.) 216 P. 2d 424,
where plaintiff filed an action for damages to his automobile resulting when he ran into defendant's parked truck.
Defendant filed a counterclaim for personal injuries.
The trial court directed a verdict in favor_ of the plaintiff and against the defendant on defendant's counterclaim from which the defendant appealed. In affirming
the judgment the Supreme Court of Colorado stated:
7
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"* • • by defendant's own testimony, corroborated by all of plaintiff's witnesses who were
present at the time of the accident, and the state
patrolman, defendant violated the laws of the
state of Colorado as provided by the statutes
thereof, admittedly was guilty of negligence which
was the. proximate cause of his injuries, and therefore·, barred his recovery of dall\ages for injuries
sustained.
"T·here being no evidence whatever to support defendant's counterclaim, and the burden of
proving the same by a preponderance of evidence
being on him, the trial court was right in directing
a verdict in favor of the plaintiff thereon."
In the case of Greisen v. Robbins, (Wash.) 216 P. 2d
210, the Washington Supreme Court in determining that
a person, parking a car so as to leave a portion the.~eof
extending out onto the hard surface of the highway, was
guilty of contributory negligence "as a matter of law, by
reason of his positive violation" of the law, gave the following reasoning:
"The duty of care, imposed by the statute,
is for the benefit of all users of the highway.
Proof of a user's negligence, if it is one of the
proximate causes of the injury, will, of course, defeat his own recovery, but that is not to say that
the violation of the statutes is thereby excused or
that the respondent owed to the appellant no duty
to obey the statutes because of his intoxication.
"The cited statutes are gene-ral in nature, and
wi.ll not bear a construction which would strike
from their purview the ap·plicability of the duty
of care in parking therein imposed as to all negligent persons as a class or to intoxicated persons
in particular.
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.. The negligence of others may not be converted
from a shield into a sword.
'~Accordingly,

've hold that the respondent
was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matte·r
of law, and that the trial court erred in not granting the motions to dismiss and for judgment n.o.v.
HThe respondent had parked his car at the
place of the accident at six o'clock in the evening,
at the entrance of a private driveway. His negligence must be presun1ed to have continued until
the time of the collision, in the absence of a showing that he could not have removed it from the
pavement. He was not in such an inextricable
position as to be able to invoke the. doctrine of
last clear chance. Chadwick v. Ek, 1 Wash. 2d 117,
95 P.2d 398; Coins v. Washington Motor Coach
'
C.o., supra. "
Applying the principles of law set forth in the above
cases to the facts of the instant case, we submit the following:
Plaintiff was not required by any emergency
to stop his truck upon the highway. This was done for
his own convenience and in spite of his knowledge that
by so doing he was "taking a big chance" and "creating
a dangerous situation on that highway." (R. 139)
(1)

(2) The truck was parked so that the rear extended
to the south beyond the hard surface, and the front to
the north within a foot of the center line, the headlights
facing just a little west of north. (R. 106, 107) The hard
surface of the road was slightly rounded so that the rear
of the truck would be lower than the front, causing the
beam from the headlights to be p-rojected upward and
9
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making it impossible for one approaching to see the truck
upon the highway. While several witnesses testified that
after the collision they were~ able to see a light at the
scene of the accident from some distance away, none of
them was able to identify the source of the light until just
before. reaching the· culvert.
( 3) No flares or other warning devices were put
out to warn approaching traffic of the obstruction on the
highway.
( 4) Although plaintiff knew that he was stopping
on a through highway (the only one leading from Laketown to Garden City and cities further north in Idaho)
he failed to leave sufficient roon1 for cars to pass; failed
to keep the motor running on the truck although he
claimed he was only going to be stopped for four or five
minutes; (R. 139) and failed to keep a lookout for approaching vehicles and therefore saw no one until he
heard defendant's truck approaching. (R. 110) At that
time the approaching truck was straight west about %
mile (R. 135), coming toward the plain tiff.
III
PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT IN PROCEEDING WESTWARDLY
ON THE NORTH HALF OF THE PAVED HIGHWAY
PROXIMATELY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ACCIDENT

In connection with the foregoing point, respondent
has cited the case of Roach v. Kyremes, Utah, (1949) 211
P. 2d 181, and Chatelain v. Thackery, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.
2d 191. In each of those cases the injured person was not
walking on the hard-surfaced portion of the highway but
was walking on the shoulder so that the facts are dis10
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tinguishable from those present in the instant matter.
In the Thackery Case the court pointed out that
there was a conflict in the evidence as to the position
of the Chatelains at the moment of impact, Mr. Chate~ain
testifying that he and his wife were "at a point about
three feet east of the hard-surfaced part of the highway
on the gravelled shoulder thereof."
In holding that the matter was one for the jury, the
court stated:
"As appears from the rather detailed statement of facts given at the beginning of this opinion, the evidence bearing upon that matter was in
conflict, both as to matters of direct testimony
and inferences to be drawn from facts and circumstances in evidence. Under such circumstances
the trial court properly submitted the question
of contributory negligence to the jury."
The same situation existed in the Roach Case where
the plaintiff and another witness both testified that they
were walking on the shoulder on the west side of the
street looking behind them for approaching traffic. In
the instant case the testimony of the plaintiff is that up·on
alighting from his truck, he proceeded over to the north
half of the paved part of the highway and ran toward the
west in the direction from which defendant was ap-proaching. ( R. 112)
In response to questions asked by his own counsel,
plaintiff testified: (R. 119, 120)
"Q.

And then you ran down the highway for a
distance of from 100 to 140 feet in the direction which the vehicle was traveling, is that
correct~

11
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A.

The op·posite direction.

Q. Well, I mean toward the vehicle 1
A.

Yes sir.

Q. And during all of that time were you observing the vehicle~
A. Yes. sir.
Q. And you had an occasion to observe the manner in which the vehicle was closing the gap
between you and it, is that correct·i
A.

Ye·s sir.''

As to his position on the hard surface he testified:
(R. 112)

"Q. And what was your position on the highway
with reference to the highway at the tune
when those brakes screeched and you say that
is the last remembrance you have 1
A.

Well, I was right over against the north edge
of the oil."

On cross-examination he further testified as follows:
(R. 148)

"Q. Well, you don't know whether you got out of
that truck and ran over to the extreme right
side and then down the highway or whether
you went diagonally across, or otherwise, do
you~

A. Well, I just think I went on that side, yes
s1r.
Q. Well, I don't ask you about what you think.
I ask you what your memory is.
A.

That is my re·collection; that I ran across the
road and down.

12
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Q. But you never did get off the· paved portion
of the highway, did you 1
A. I wouldn't know.

Q. What is that Y
A. I wouldn't know.

Q. Now when you ran down there he was on
the south side of the highway, wasn't he 1
. .\..

I presume he was.

Q.

~fr.

Early, do you remember after I questioned you that day, I think that was in the
Federal Building, that Mr. Strong asked you
some questions about your course down the
highway and here is his examination ; by Mr.
Strong. This is on page 37. Question, and
this is by Mr. Strong: 'I have got one question I want to ask you. At the time when you
were struck by the car what was your position
on the highway with reference to the paved
portion of the road and the north shoulder~
Where were you on the road f And the answer: 'Well, I was over-' and then you
hesitated, 'I was as close as I could get to
the north side.' Question: 'Of the oiled road~'
and your answer: 'Yes sir, and still on the
oil.' So you were on the oil when you were
hit, weren't you 1

A.

I wouldn't know that.

Q. Well, you answered Mr. Strong one time that
you were~
A. Yes sir."
Not only do we have plaintiff's testimony as to his
position on the highway, but we also have the physical

13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

evidence as to the course of travel of defendant's truck
from the time the brakes were applie,d until it came to
rest in the slough on the north part of the right-of-way.
RoJand A. Reese, the State highway patrolman who
visited the scene of the accident approximately two
days after it happened, testified that he saw two tire
marks starting in the middle of the road "straddle" the
middle line at a point approximately 114 feet west of
the culvert (R. 166, 169). ]-,rom there the brake marks
proceHded in a straight line toward the northeast part
of the highway so that by the tiine they reached the
culvert they were entirely off the hard surface and on
the graveled shoulder.
Other evidence; in the record shows conclusively
that plaintiff was on the hard surface, or oiled portion,
of the road. In this regard, we call the court's attention
to Exhibit ____ , which is the photo of the defendant's truck.
This exhibit shows the imprint of plaintiff's body in the
grill and hood just off the center line of the vehicle,
unmistakably the point of impact. All the evidence is
that defendant's truck did not leave the oiled surface
of the highway until it was approximately opposite the
plaintiff's parked truck.
Plaintiff was not only on the hard surface of the
highway, but was necessarily several feet in from the
north edge, because he was struck at least two or three
feet in from the left front edge of defendant's truck,
which in turn was well on the hard surface at the time
of impact.
Plaintiff's hat and gloves were found at a point

14
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100 feet 'vest of the culvert, indicating that he must
have been at least that far from his truck when he was
struck (R. 187, 202-203).
It is apparent fron1 this evidence that the farther
west from the truck plaintiff had run before he was
struck, the closer to the middle of the hard surface of
the highway he n1ust have been. If he had reached a
point 100 to 140 feet 'vest of the culvert before he was
hit, he 'Yas necessarily almost in the middle of the highway. On the other hand if he was approximately 50
feet west of the culvert he would have been near the
middle of the north lane. Too, the evidence discloses
that the farther one went to the west from the culvert
the wider the shoulder became, but that the shoulder
was three feet to four feet in width (R. 103). Exhibit
2 indicates the general contour of the hard surface and
the extent of the shoulders on either side of the black
top.
We, therefore, have the plaintiff running in a westerly direction on the north half of the hard surface,
toward the approaching vehicle, after he by his own
carelessness had created a dangerous situation with
respect to other vehicles attempting to use the roadway.
Certainly he is in no better position than a casual pedestrian walking along the roadway on the right side of the
road when the statute requires such pedestrian to use
the left side of the roadway in order to be aware of
approaching traffic.
On this point, in addition to the authorities cited
in appellant's brief several other cases have been found

15
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de·aling with the question of whether the walking on the
hard surface of the highway would, as a matter of law,
bar a recovery against the drive·r of the vehicle colliding with such person.
In the case of South Hill Motor Company v. Gordon, 172 V a. 193, 200 S.E. 637, it appeared that plaintiff
who was walking on the edge of the hard surface highway was struck by defendant's automobile coming from
the opposite direction. In that case plaintiff testified
that he saw defendant's automobile approaching when it
was four hundred yards distant; that he continued to
watch it until it was approximately ten to fifteen steps
away, at which time he pulled the brin1 of his hat down
in order to shade his eyes, still watching the approaching automobile and maintaining his position. He further
testified that he did not step to the left because he
thought the car would clear him.
In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff and directing a verdict to be entered for the defendant, the Court
held:
"Under normal conditions, the pedestrian
must keep as near as reasonably possible to the
extreme left side or edge of the highway, and the
operator of a motor vehicle must drive upon his
right-hand side of the highway. And when it
happens that both of them desire, or require, to
use, at the same time, that portion of the. highway prescribed for their use, each of them must
exercise his respective right to the use with due
regard for the right of the other. Neither the
pede strian nor the operator of a vehicle., traveling
along the portion of the highway prescribed for
1
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the use of each of them has a 'right of way' thereon over the other, except as expressly provided
by statute. The mere right to travel on a specified
portion of a highway is not to be confused with
a 'right of way' thereon superior to the rights
of others also entitled to use the highway. The
right to the use is an equal and coordinate right.
Both persons and operators of vehicles are held
to the exercise of ordinary care and are bound
to respect the rights of each other. And when
either observes danger to or from the other, he
must exercise ordinary and reasonable care to
avoid danger. The duty of each to avoid givilng
or receiving injury is reciprocal. * * * The plaintiff can make no stronger case than is shown by
his own testimony. He is bound by his account
of what he saw and did. His own evidence discloses that he was guilty of contributory negligence as an efficient and p-roximate cause of the
collision. * * * Assuming that the defendant
here was negligent in operating his motor vehicle
under the conditions re·cited, he had no knowledge,
or anything to put him on notice, that the plaintiff was unable to protect himself. There is no
reason for discrediting his testimony, that he
was unable to see the plaintiff in time to save
him from injury on account of the lights on the
approaching cars. There was no time for effective
action after the discovery of the peril of the
plaintiff. In order to apply the doctrine of last
clear chance, the burden was upon the plaintiff
to show affirmatively by a preponderance of the
evidence that. the defendant might have avoided
the collision by the use of ordinary care after
he discovered, or should have discovered the
peril of the plaintiff. The doctrine of the last
elear chance, as ap-plying to both parties, has
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been so often discus~sed by us that it is doubtful
if anything more of value can be added." (Italics
added)
In the above case plaintiff was actually walking
on the left side of the highwa.y as required by statute
but he failed to move! over or get out of the. way of the
approaching vehicle which he· saw at all times. Except
for that fact and for the further fact that there was no
other obstruction on the highway, the facts in the two
cases are very similar. We believe· the circumstances in
the instant case are much stronger for appellant than
those in the Gordon case.
In Flaumers v. Samuels, 4 Wash. 2d 609, 104 P. 2d
484, the plaintiff sued to recover for personal injuries
occasioned when he was struck by an automobile while
walking along the left portion of that part of the divided
part of the highway reserved for automobiles proceeding
in the same direction in which he was traveling. The
highway was a six lane highway divided by a strip o.f
gravel in the center. He was pulling a small cart, having
one wheel of the cart upon the pavement and one wheel
upon the gravel shoulde-r. Defendant was traveling in
the center traffic lane and moved to the left to pass a
slower moving vehicle when he was confronted with the
cart being pulled by plaintiff. Although defendant attempted to turn to the right he was unable to miss 18triking plain tiff's cart, throwing it forward against the
plaintiff. The case was tried to a jury resulting in a
verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal the Supreme Court
discussed only the proposi~tion of contributory negligence
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of the plaintiff and held, quoting from an earlier case
of Benson v. Anderson, 1~9 Wash. 19, 223 P.163:
"The statutory enactments regulating traffic
upon the public highways are Inade to be obeyed.
They are the outgrowth of necessity. On the
observance of then1 depends the safety of the
users of such highways. Failure to obey them
not only endangers the safety of the person
guilty of the disobedience, but it endangers the
safety of others using them in a lawful manner.
Courts, therefore, should not look lightly upon
infractions of these regulations. One injured
while in the act of disobedience· of them should
be compelled to show with clearness that his act
in no way contributed to his injury."
In applying the foregoing principle'S to the facts in
the case before it the Washington Supreme Court held :
"It plainly appears from respondent's own
testimony and from other undisputed facts of the
case not only that respondent was guilty of violation of a positive statute, but also that such violation was a substantial factor in producing the
injuries. This being so we are compelled to hold,
as a matter of law, that respondent was guilty of
contributory negligence and cannot recover."
In Anderson vs. Holsteen (Ia.), 26 N.W. 2d 855,
the pedestrian was injured while walking on the right
side of a gravel highway eighteen inches to two fee·t from
the edge. The defendant, operating an automobile in the
same direction approached the point where plaintiff was
proceeding. Another pedestrian walking a short distance
behind the plaintiff step·ped to one side upon hearing
defendant's car, but plaintiff failed to move and was
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struck. At the· conclusion of plain~iff's evidence, the trial
court directed a verdict for the defendant from which
the plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court of Iowa in
discussing 'the; case assumed that defendant was negligent
in one or more of the particulars charged and considered
only the proposition of whether plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence as a matter of law. In so doing,
the court stated :
"Plaintiff urges that the violation of the
statute is only prima facie evidence of negligence.
Citing McElhinney v. Knittle, 199 Iowa 278, 201
N.W. 587; Lang v. Siddall, 218 Iowa 263, 254
N.W. 783. In this case, under the~ facts, there
is little difference between negligence per se in
violation of a statute and prima facie evidence of
negligence. On a showing of violation of the
statute, as in this case, the burden is upon the
plaintiff to justify such violation. "The effect
of the statute and the ordinance is to lay the
burden orf justification upon the man who was on
the wrong side of the street." He.rdman, Adm'r, v.
Zwart, 167 Iowa 500, 149 N.W. 631, 632."
See also Herzberg vs. White (Ariz.), 66 P. (2d) 253,
in which we believe the principle is very similar to the
case here before the court.
The pertinent facts of that case are that the defendant had received a puncture while proceeding on the
highway in the State of Arizona, had pulled o:ver to the
right of the traveled portion of the~ highway, which was
36 feet wide and consisted of four traveling lanes, but
left his automobile from 3 to 8 feet on to the right most
lane of the highway. The defendant had then proceeded
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to repair the left rear tire which had be·come punctured
and the deceased, for "'"hom the suit 'vas brought, stood
in the next lane of traffic and held a flashlight for the .
defendant. Another automobile proceeding along the
san1e highway struck both the deceased and the defendant. Since the identity of this automobile was ne:ver
determined, the suit "'"as brought for the wrongful death
of the person holding the flashlight against the defendant, 'Yho was the operator of the parked vehicle.
The court held as a matter of law that the defendant ·
was guilty of negligence in parking his car upon the
traveled portion of the highway without lights and also
held that a finding that this negligent conduct was a
proximate cause of the death of the plaintiff's intestate,
who was holding the flashlight, was justified.
Because of a constitutional provision requiring the
jury to pass upon the defense of contributory ne.gligence
and making it a question of fact in all cases, the court
could not rule on contributory negligence but nevertheless the court further held that if such conduct was
found by a jury to be negligent that such conduct was
necessarily a proximate cause of the deceased's death
and stated its conclusion as follows:
"We come then to the other defense urged
by defendant which is, in substance, that his negligence was not the proximate cause of the aecident. It is the law that where an injury is produced by an intervening and superseding cause,
even though the original negligence may have
been a substantial factor in bringing about the
injury, the original actor is not legally responsible therefor.
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"Any reasonable person must be held to have
known and anticipated, therefore., that cars might
pass on the pavement where defendant had parked
his car almos't momentarily. Under such circumstances, the parking of the car partially on the
paved portion of the highway after dark, with
the lights out, created a situation of such danger
that an ordinarily prudent man should have
anticipated that persons standing on the pavement to the left of the car might be struck at any
time by a passing automobile. It thus appears
that the active intervening cause, being of such
a nature tltat it could or should have been reasonably anticipated by defendant, was not a superseding cause."
It is to be noted that in the instant case before this
court the activities of plaintiff are identical with the
conduct of both the defendant and the plaintiff's intestate and in principle it can be seen that the act of
parking the car without lights on the highway is a contributing cause to an injury to a person standing in the
lane to the left of the parked car, and similarly the act
of standing in the lane next to the car so parked is a
contributing cause to any injuries received by such
person. We subrn.it, therefore, in the instant case, that
both the acts of negligence of the plaintiff, that is the
parking without lights upon the traveled portion of the
highway and proceeding down the other traveled lane of
the highway, as a matter of law, contributed proximately
to his injuries.
See also Starndridge v. Godsey, 187 Tenn. 522, 226
S.W. 2d 277; Henry v. Hallquist, 226 Minn. 39, 31 N.W.
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2d 641; Wells v. Burton Lines, Inc., 228 N.c·. 422, 45
S.E. 2d 569; Saunders v. Temple, 154 Va. 714, 153 S.E.
691; Steen v. Hedstrom, 189 Wash. 75, 63 P. 2d 507.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion we again call attention of the Court
to the fact that the plaintiff in this case acted in violation of several laws designed for his own safety and protection. He set the stage·for the things which were later
to happen. He did it knowingly and with his eyes open.
Conscious of this dangerous situation, when he heard
the defendant's truck approaching, he lost his head and
thereby nearly lost his life. Being the primary factor and
moving force in the entire chain of circumstances, he
should not now be allowed to recover from the other
participant who, of the two, had the less opportunity to
avoid the accident.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J. JENSEN,
R. A. BURNS,
STEWART, CANNON & HANSON,
Attorneys for Appella;n,t.
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